The UAE has turned geography into energy security. Pakistan still treats geography as an achievement in itself.

A crisis visible from Karachi
From Karachi, the Strait of Hormuz can feel distant until a tanker slows down. I do not see the warships from my office, but their presence enters Pakistan through fuel prices and shipping notices. A military warning issued hundreds of kilometres away can reach a household here as a larger electricity bill.

On 7 September 2026, UAE presidential adviser Anwar Gargash said his country would not allow its energy exports to remain “held hostage” by the Iran conflict. Abu Dhabi plans to expand port capacity on its eastern coast and strengthen routes that avoid Hormuz. Reuters reported that the UAE now sees infrastructure as protection against regional insecurity.

Gargash’s words carried frustration with Iran, but they also revealed declining Gulf confidence in American protection.

Naval power can escort some vessels and deter certain attacks. It cannot guarantee ordinary commercial movement through a waterway where rival states claim the power to decide who may pass.

Why Fujairah matters

The UAE did not discover its vulnerability during the present crisis. In 2012, it began operating the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline, commonly called the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline. The line transports crude from fields in Abu Dhabi to Fujairah, an emirate facing the Gulf of Oman.

Fujairah sits east of the Strait of Hormuz. Tankers loading there do not need to enter the strait, because the crude has already crossed the country by land. The pipeline can carry as much as 1.8 million barrels per day, and the UAE is accelerating another project intended to expand that bypass capacity.

The distinction matters. Fujairah does not protect the UAE simply because it occupies a useful point on the map. A working pipeline connects the port to producing fields, while storage facilities allow crude to wait for a vessel.

Even this system cannot remove every Emirati vulnerability. Crude oil can travel through a conventional pipeline, but LNG depends on specialised terminals and refrigerated carriers. Commercial cargo trapped inside the Gulf also cannot escape merely because Fujairah has expanded its berths.

The UAE has still achieved something important. It has reduced the amount of national income that one narrow waterway can hold at risk. Geography supplied an opening, and sustained investment turned the opening into measurable capacity.

Gwadar’s misleading advantage

I look west from Karachi and see Pakistan making a different calculation. Gwadar also lies east of Hormuz, but so do Karachi Port and Port Qasim. Moving a tanker from Port Qasim to Gwadar does not solve a blockage that prevents the vessel from leaving its Gulf loading terminal.

Pakistan’s exposure begins at the source. Oil loaded inside the Gulf must cross Hormuz before it can travel towards any Pakistani port. Gwadar becomes a genuine bypass only if Pakistan connects it to energy arriving through an overland route or from a terminal already located outside the strait.

Political speeches often skip that step. Officials point towards Gwadar’s location and describe it as proof of Pakistan’s strategic value. A coordinate on the Arabian Sea cannot transport crude inland.

Gwadar could support petroleum storage and refining. It could also serve regional distribution if regular cargoes made the commercial numbers work. None of those functions emerges automatically from deep water or proximity to Gulf shipping routes.

A functional energy port must answer blunt questions. How much crude can it unload during a disruption, and where will that crude go after it reaches the terminal? Pakistan has not yet produced convincing operational answers.

Pakistan’s actual energy system

Port Qasim remains central to Pakistan’s imported LNG system. Karachi and the nearby Hub area also sit close to refineries, pipelines and the country’s largest concentration of energy demand. Existing infrastructure therefore continues to pull cargo towards the Karachi coast.

Gwadar lies far from Pakistan’s main consumption centres. Crude unloaded there would require adequate storage before entering a long inland transport system. No operating pipeline currently gives Gwadar the function that Habshan-Fujairah gives the UAE.

Road tankers cannot carry strategic volumes efficiently across Balochistan and onward to Punjab. Rail capacity also cannot replace a dedicated pipeline during a major supply shock. Gwadar’s external position means little when the inland connection ends at a presentation slide.

Pakistan has discussed large refineries at Gwadar for years. Announced investment values have changed, while financing arrangements remain uncertain. Ceremony has moved faster than construction.

I have seen this pattern often enough to distrust another headline. A project acquires a price tag before lenders confirm the commercial case, then officials describe the announcement itself as progress. The refinery remains a political object while imported fuel continues entering through established terminals elsewhere.

Storage is the missing argument
Pakistan’s immediate weakness concerns storage as much as port location. The country has lacked a fully developed strategic petroleum reserve capable of cushioning a prolonged external disruption. Commercial stocks support ordinary operations, but they do not provide the same protection as state-backed emergency reserves.

Reuters reported in May 2026 that Pakistan planned to expand oil storage after the Hormuz crisis exposed its dependence on Gulf supplies. The proposed framework included additional facilities near Hub and Port Qasim, with wider implementation extending towards 2028. The plan also considered a dedicated funding mechanism for strategic reserves

A storage tank lacks the political glamour of a new port. It does not produce sweeping corridor maps or ceremonial photographs. During a shipping interruption, however, stored fuel matters more than a harbour with no assured cargo.

The UAE built much of its bypass infrastructure before the latest escalation proved its value. Pakistan began discussing stronger reserves after the danger became immediate. One state bought physical insurance, while the other reached again for a planning document.

Gwadar is not Fujairah

A cautious description would call Gwadar an underused strategic asset. I will put the problem more sharply: Gwadar is not yet the energy-security asset that Pakistan’s political language claims it to be. Potential does not power a refinery or protect a fuel shipment.

Fujairah receives crude through a dedicated connection to producing fields. Gwadar does not possess an equivalent link to the sources trapped behind Hormuz. Treating the two ports as comparable confuses location with function.

Pakistan could receive supplies originating outside the Gulf through Gwadar, but those cargoes could also reach other Pakistani ports. Gwadar would need a specific commercial advantage to justify the additional inland cost. Strategic vocabulary cannot settle that calculation.

The port’s proximity to Iran adds another complication. Peace can turn the Makran coast into a valuable zone for regional trade. Conflict can expose the same route to sanctions or physical danger before a tanker reaches Pakistani waters.

A direct energy relationship with Iran could alter Gwadar’s role, especially if pipelines or formal land corridors developed. American sanctions make that possibility financially difficult. Banks and insurers would examine the transaction before engineers examined the route.
Security promises and physical systems
Gargash’s statement contains a lesson larger than the UAE. Gulf governments no longer assume that American military protection can preserve every commercial route. Abu Dhabi has started converting uncertainty into pipelines and external port capacity.

Pakistan continues to place greater faith in strategic relationships. China becomes the answer when Gwadar comes up, while Gulf partners appear whenever refinery investment returns to the news. Foreign friendship cannot substitute for a funded project with customers.

CPEC gave Gwadar international visibility. It did not automatically give the port regular shipping volume or a national energy function. A corridor becomes real when cargo continues moving after the press conference has ended.

The present Hormuz disruption makes the gap harder to ignore. On 8 September, Reuters reported another decline in tracked commodity traffic through the strait as Iran threatened further retaliation. Only seven commodity vessels reportedly crossed on Monday.

Karachi feels such reductions even when a Pakistani vessel crosses safely. Insurers price regional danger, and shipping companies charge for uncertainty. Port Qasim receives the cargo, but Hormuz can still determine its cost.

The map remains unfinished

Gwadar may one day support storage or refining on a serious scale. A pipeline could connect it with Pakistan’s demand centres, provided the economics survive beyond political enthusiasm. Regular throughput would then give the port strategic weight that speeches cannot manufacture.

Fujairah already performs that role for the UAE because Abu Dhabi invested in the less visible parts of power. Pipe connects the oilfield to the coast. Storage gives the shipment time.

Pakistan possesses the geography but not the complete system. The distinction should trouble anyone who hears Gwadar described as an automatic answer to Hormuz. A port outside the strait cannot protect energy that never reaches it.
The current crisis may ease before Pakistan builds the missing infrastructure. Oil prices could fall, and attention may return to another emergency. Gwadar will remain where it has always been, safely outside Hormuz while Pakistan’s energy supply remains trapped on the other side.