From Karachi, wars in the Gulf never feel very far away.

You notice them at the petrol pump. You hear businesses worrying about shipping. Then somebody starts discussing what another disruption in the Strait of Hormuz could do to Pakistan.

This time, however, Pakistan is not merely watching a Middle Eastern crisis arrive at its doorstep.

Islamabad is sitting unusually close to the diplomatic table.

Pakistan has spent months trying to keep negotiations between Iran and the United States alive. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Türkiye have joined consultations around a framework first developed in Islamabad. The United Nations has publicly praised Pakistan’s mediation.

Now the diplomatic activity has moved to New York.

During the UN General Assembly this week, US President Donald Trump said American representatives had held lengthy talks involving the Iranian side. He later said negotiations were continuing and expressed confidence that a settlement could eventually emerge.

Pakistan suddenly finds itself in an unfamiliar position.

For years, we have talked about being strategically important because of geography.

This time geography may actually be producing diplomatic leverage.

But Pakistan’s role is more complicated than the celebratory headlines suggest.

Islamabad is trying to remain close to Saudi Arabia while maintaining relations with Iran. It wants stronger ties with Washington without appearing to join an anti-Iran coalition.

And behind all this diplomacy sits something much less glamorous.

Pakistan needs the Gulf to remain open because another energy shock could land directly on Pakistani households.

The story began before New York

Pakistan’s present role did not suddenly emerge at the UN General Assembly.

It developed through months of diplomacy following the Iran-US conflict.

Pakistan’s Foreign Office says Islamabad helped bring representatives of Iran and the United States into the same negotiating process after decades of hostility.

Those contacts eventually produced what Pakistani officials call the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding.

The Foreign Office has repeatedly described that framework as a possible route back toward de-escalation.

Pakistan was not working alone.

Oman and Qatar have played roles. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye have also become increasingly important participants in the regional diplomatic effort.

That distinction matters.

Pakistan is a mediator.

It is not the sole mediator.

The difference may sound small, but it prevents us from exaggerating Islamabad’s influence over two governments whose strategic objectives remain far apart.

Iran has its own security calculations.

Washington has its own demands.

Pakistan cannot dictate the outcome to either.

What it can do is keep channels open when direct trust is weak.

That may be its real value.

Something unusual happened at the United Nations

The latest developments in New York make the story more interesting.

Trump said on September 22 that US representatives had been talking with Iran and that he believed a settlement would eventually be reached.

Reuters reported that he described continuing contact between the two sides even as his public rhetoric toward Tehran remained extremely hard.

That contradiction is worth noticing.

Washington can threaten Iran publicly while still exploring negotiations privately.

Tehran can condemn American pressure while signalling conditions under which diplomacy might resume.

Between those positions sits a group of regional states trying to stop another escalation.

Pakistan is now part of that group.

Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar met his counterparts from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Türkiye on the margins of the UN General Assembly.

Their joint statement reaffirmed the importance of dialogue and diplomacy.

More significantly for Islamabad, the four governments explicitly referred to the need to uphold the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding.

That gives the Pakistani initiative something it did not have at the beginning.

Regional ownership.

Even the United Nations is acknowledging Pakistan’s role

Governments frequently describe their own diplomacy as successful.

Independent acknowledgement matters more.

The office of UN Secretary-General António Guterres was asked this month about Pakistan’s mediation between Iran and the United States.

The response was unusually clear.

The Secretary-General, his spokesperson said, was grateful for Pakistan’s efforts and regarded the Islamabad understanding as an important achievement. The spokesperson described Pakistan’s role as critical, while also recognising that other countries were involved.

That qualification is useful.

Pakistan has become important to the process without becoming indispensable to it.

This is probably the most accurate way to understand Islamabad’s position.

Why would Iran trust Pakistan?

The answer begins with geography.

Pakistan shares a long border with Iran.

The relationship has never been simple. There have been security disputes along the frontier, accusations involving militant sanctuaries and occasional periods of serious tension.

Yet Pakistan and Iran have kept diplomatic channels functioning.

Islamabad has also avoided treating its relationship with Tehran entirely through the lens of its relationships with Saudi Arabia or the United States.

The Foreign Office made this argument explicitly in September.

Pakistan, it said, has independent relations with both Iran and Saudi Arabia and does not view one relationship through competition with the other.

That is partly diplomatic language.

But it also describes the balancing act Pakistan has been attempting.

Iran knows Pakistan has deep ties with Saudi Arabia.

It knows Pakistan wants a productive relationship with Washington.

Yet Tehran continues talking to Islamabad.

That means Pakistan still possesses something useful in diplomacy.

Access.

Why would Washington listen?

Pakistan’s relationship with the United States has also changed.

Not long ago, discussions about Pakistan in Washington were dominated by Afghanistan, counterterrorism and mistrust.

The relationship today is broader.

There has been renewed political engagement between the two governments. Security cooperation remains important, but economic and regional issues have returned to the conversation.

The Iran crisis gives Pakistan another function.

Islamabad can communicate with Tehran in ways Washington sometimes cannot.

This does not mean Pakistan has suddenly become America’s preferred Middle Eastern intermediary.

Oman and Qatar have far deeper experience in that role.

But Pakistan brings a different combination to the table.

It borders Iran.

It has close ties with Saudi Arabia.

And it maintains working relationships with Washington and other important regional capitals.

Very few countries occupy precisely that position.

Saudi Arabia makes the balancing act harder

This is where the story becomes delicate.

Pakistan’s relationship with Saudi Arabia is not peripheral.

It is strategically important.

Saudi Arabia has repeatedly supported Pakistan economically. Millions of Pakistanis have worked in the kingdom and elsewhere in the Gulf. Remittances from the region remain important to Pakistani households.

Security relations have also deepened.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia is facing renewed attacks associated with Yemen’s Houthis, who are aligned with Iran.

On September 22, the foreign ministers of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Türkiye jointly condemned attacks against the kingdom and affirmed Saudi Arabia’s right to defend itself in accordance with international law.

Pakistan therefore cannot present itself as neutral in the sense of being indifferent to Saudi security.

Nor can it afford a rupture with Iran.

That leaves Islamabad walking along a very narrow diplomatic ridge.

Support Saudi security.

Keep Tehran talking.

Encourage Washington to negotiate.

Do not allow Pakistan itself to become a battlefield in someone else’s rivalry.

Simple on paper.

Much harder in practice.

Pakistan has already carried messages between Riyadh and Tehran

This balancing role is not theoretical.

Reuters reported earlier this month that Pakistan conveyed a Saudi warning to Iran concerning Houthi attacks on the kingdom.

That is significant.

A state trusted to carry sensitive messages is doing more than issuing ceremonial statements about peace.

But it also exposes Pakistan to risk.

If relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia deteriorate sharply, Islamabad may eventually face demands that cannot be reconciled through diplomatic wording.

Mediation works best while all sides still want a mediator.

It becomes much harder when governments begin asking: whose side are you on?

Pakistan should be careful not to confuse access with control.

Then there is the Strait of Hormuz

For me, this is where foreign policy meets the Karachi petrol pump.

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most important energy corridors.

Before the current conflict, roughly one-fifth of global oil and gas shipments moved through it.

When shipping is disrupted, the consequences travel quickly.

Energy prices rise.

Insurance costs increase.

Supply chains become more expensive.

Developing economies absorb the shock.

Pakistan is particularly exposed because it depends heavily on imported energy and has limited fiscal room to cushion a prolonged price surge.

We have already seen what that vulnerability looks like.

The Gulf crisis has pushed Asian LNG prices sharply higher. Pakistan has struggled with expensive energy procurement while the government has introduced fuel relief to soften the effect of unusually high petrol and diesel prices.

This is why Ishaq Dar’s recent conversation with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi focused not only on peace.

Dar specifically raised uninterrupted energy supplies and safe passage for ships.

That is Pakistani foreign policy speaking the language of economic survival.

Mediation could have an economic dividend

There is another possibility.

If Pakistan helps produce a durable diplomatic settlement, it could gain something beyond prestige.

A more stable Gulf would reduce pressure on energy prices and shipping.

Improved relations with Washington could create room for economic engagement.

Pakistan could also strengthen its position with Gulf governments that increasingly see regional stability as essential to their own economic transformation.

But none of this is guaranteed.

Diplomatic visibility does not automatically produce investment.

A photograph with powerful leaders does not reduce Pakistan’s debt.

Praise at the United Nations does not fix the power sector.

Pakistan has made this mistake before.

We sometimes convert strategic importance into a story about national prestige before asking what material benefit actually followed.

This time the test should be harder.

Does diplomacy reduce Pakistan’s economic vulnerability?

Does it protect energy supplies?

Does it improve trade?

Does it create sustained access to major capitals after the immediate crisis passes?

Those outcomes matter more than applause.

China is somewhere in the background

There is another player Pakistan cannot ignore.

China.

Beijing has substantial economic interests in both Pakistan and Iran and has pushed for regional de-escalation.

Earlier this year, Reuters reported on a China-initiated effort involving Pakistan and Iran to explore a route back toward negotiations with Washington.

That creates an interesting diplomatic geometry.

Pakistan can speak with Washington.

It can speak with Beijing.

It can speak with Tehran.

It can coordinate with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye.

That network gives Islamabad unusual access.

But again, access should not be mistaken for power.

Pakistan remains economically vulnerable.

Its bargaining strength is not comparable with that of China or the United States.

Its advantage is connectivity between diplomatic camps.

That advantage disappears if Islamabad becomes identified completely with one of them.

The opportunity is real, but so is the trap

From Karachi, I find this moment fascinating because Pakistan has spent decades describing itself as a bridge.

Between South Asia and Central Asia.

Between China and the Muslim world.

Between Washington and difficult regional actors.

Much of that language became cliché.

The Iran crisis has produced a rare case where Pakistan actually appears to be functioning as a bridge.

Iran talks to Islamabad.

Saudi Arabia coordinates with it.

Washington listens.

Türkiye and Egypt sit beside it.

The United Nations publicly acknowledges its contribution.

That is meaningful.

But bridges carry weight from both directions.

If negotiations succeed, Pakistan may emerge with stronger diplomatic credibility.

If they collapse, Islamabad could find itself squeezed between Saudi security concerns, Iranian expectations and American pressure.

And if the Gulf conflict escalates again, Pakistan will not experience it as an abstract geopolitical setback.

We will see it in freight bills.

We will see it in electricity costs.

Eventually, we will see it at the petrol pump.

That is why Pakistan is suddenly in the middle of Iran-US diplomacy.

Not because Islamabad has become a great power.

Because geography, relationships and economic vulnerability have briefly aligned to make Pakistan useful to almost everyone involved.

The difficult part comes next.

Pakistan must remain useful without becoming trapped.