A reader responding to Friedrich Merz’s warnings about Russia mentioned two dates: 1914 and 1939. The sarcasm was obvious. Germany helped plunge Europe into one world war and deliberately started another. Now its chancellor warns Europeans about Russian aggression.

Germany’s history cannot be separated from this debate. But the Germany that invaded the Soviet Union in 1941 is not the democratic Germany of 2026. Nor was the Soviet Union that defeated Hitler identical to today’s Russian Federation.

Germany spent decades building commercial ties with Moscow. Russian gas helped fuel its industrial economy. Now Berlin regards Russia as a security threat, while German businesses struggle with energy costs. What changed, and who pays for it?

1914: Germany helped turn a Balkan crisis into a European war

On 28 June 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo. Austria-Hungary blamed Serbia. Germany gave Vienna strong backing, although an attack risked drawing Russia into the conflict. Historians call this support the German blank cheque.

Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on 28 July. Russia mobilised, and Germany declared war on Russia on 1 August. Germany declared war on France two days later and invaded neutral Belgium. Britain entered the war on 4 August.

Germany bears substantial responsibility for the escalation. Its leaders encouraged Austria-Hungary and accepted the danger of a wider conflict. Yet Austria-Hungary made its own decisions, and Russia’s mobilisation intensified the crisis. The Imperial War Museums’ account explains the chain of decisions. Responsibility for 1914 remains more complex than responsibility for 1939.

1939: Nazi Germany launched a war of conquest

Hitler had already dismantled German democracy, rebuilt military power and pursued territorial expansion. Nazi Germany annexed Austria in 1938, secured the Sudetenland through the Munich Agreement and occupied the Czech lands in March 1939.

On 1 September 1939, Germany invaded Poland. Britain and France declared war two days later. Nazi Germany deliberately started World War II in Europe. Its plans for conquest were tied to racial domination and systematic persecution. The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum documents the invasion.

Germany and the Soviet Union were partners before they became enemies

On 23 August 1939, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Its secret protocol divided parts of Eastern Europe into spheres of influence. Germany invaded Poland from the west on 1 September. Soviet forces entered eastern Poland on 17 September. Both governments participated in Poland’s partition.

That cooperation did not last. On 22 June 1941, Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa, invading the Soviet Union. Nazi occupation brought mass killings, starvation and exploitation. The Eastern Front became the deadliest theatre of the war.

The Soviet Union suffered immense military and civilian losses. The Red Army eventually captured Berlin in 1945. Its contribution to Nazi Germany’s defeat was decisive, alongside the wider Allied effort. But the Soviet Union was not Russia alone. Ukrainians, Belarusians and other Soviet peoples fought and suffered. Today’s Russia cannot claim exclusive ownership of their sacrifice. The Holocaust Museum’s account of the pact sets out the earlier cooperation.

After 1945, Germany abandoned territorial expansion

Berlin was devastated when the war ended. Germany was occupied and eventually divided. West Germany developed parliamentary democracy and joined NATO in 1955. East Germany belonged to the Soviet-led system.

West Germany pursued industrial recovery and European economic integration. Reunification came in 1990, with unified Germany remaining inside NATO and European institutions.

Criticism of Merz’s policies is legitimate. But treating today’s parliamentary republic as a continuation of Hitler’s dictatorship ignores fundamental changes in its institutions and international commitments.

How Germany became dependent on Russian energy

West German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik encouraged engagement with Eastern Europe. Commercial gas arrangements with the Soviet Union developed in the early 1970s. Pipeline trade expanded, surviving the Cold War and German reunification.

By 2021, Russia accounted for about 52% of Germany’s gas imports. That supported energy-intensive production but created a concentration of supply. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, pipeline deliveries fell sharply and Germany sought alternatives through European networks and LNG infrastructure.

According to the Federal Network Agency, Norway accounted for 44% of German gas imports in 2025, the Netherlands 24% and Belgium 21%. Germany recorded no direct Russian imports. These figures show entry countries, not necessarily the original source of every shipment.

Would Russian gas make German industry competitive again?

One reader argued that Merz should focus on cheap energy rather than Russia. The concern has an economic basis. A chemical factory may use natural gas both as fuel and an industrial input. When prices rise, production becomes more expensive and investment elsewhere looks more attractive.

Workers face uncertainty when companies cut production. Families have less money for everyday spending when heating bills rise. The German Economic Ministry reported in October 2026 that September consumer prices were 3.3% above a year earlier, with energy prices almost 15% higher.

But Germany’s industrial problems did not begin in 2022. An ageing workforce, investment shortfalls and competition from China also matter. The challenge of attracting private investment is one I examined in an earlier article.

Returning to Russian gas would not guarantee former prices. Contracts, infrastructure and European restrictions would matter. Germany would also need to weigh possible cost savings against renewed dependence on a supplier whose relationship with Europe had already broken down.

Germany is recovering, but households remain under pressure

In October 2026, the German government forecast GDP growth of 1.3% for 2026 and 1.1% for 2027. These are projections, not completed annual results. Modest growth does not mean the country has collapsed, but neither does it erase household hardship.

A worker cares about job security and wages, not only national output. As I discussed in why workers can feel poorer during economic growth, headline recovery figures may not reflect a family’s purchasing power.

What Merz actually said about Russia

In a Bloomberg interview on 19 October 2026, Merz warned that Europe’s societies were underestimating Russia’s influence. His concern extended beyond the fighting in Ukraine to attempts to weaken European democratic institutions. See the Bloomberg interview.

Cyber operations, sabotage and political interference are not the same as a conventional invasion. Putin has repeatedly denied intending to attack NATO countries. European governments nevertheless consider Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 when assessing his assurances.

Russia’s actions show a willingness to use force against a neighbouring sovereign state. They do not establish that an invasion of Germany is imminent. The domestic political dispute also deserves attention. My earlier article on Alice Weidel’s challenge to Merz over Russia and Ukraine explores that divide.

Germany’s history offers conflicting lessons

The events of 1914 show how governments can underestimate escalation. The events of 1939 show the danger of territorial conquest. Neither episode predicts exactly what Putin will do next.

NATO’s collective defence commitments and nuclear deterrence make today’s circumstances different. German policymakers need contemporary evidence about Russian intentions and capabilities, not a simple analogy with the past.

What should German taxpayers expect from Merz?

Germany has increased defence spending and remains a major supporter of Ukraine. Merz argues that these commitments help protect European security. Critics question the costs and want greater emphasis on diplomacy and domestic recovery.

Germany also needs investment in infrastructure and must manage pressure on pension finances. Defence contracts may support domestic manufacturers, but public spending still requires choices. The government should explain which military capabilities it needs, what they cost and how they reduce risk.

Critics face questions too. If Germany reduced assistance to Ukraine, what security arrangement would replace it? If Russian gas imports resumed, how would another supply disruption be prevented? These questions matter more than labelling every opponent a warmonger or a Putin sympathiser.

Germany cannot live in 1945 or return to 2021

Germany’s past makes military power sensitive. Its former energy relationship with Russia makes confrontation economically painful. The history cannot settle the current policy dispute.

Germany’s responsibility for World War II does not invalidate every warning its leaders make about Russia. The Soviet victory over Hitler does not justify the invasion of Ukraine. And the former availability of Russian gas does not prove that restoring imports would fix Germany’s industrial problems.

A factory worker worried about employment has reason to ask what Berlin is doing about energy costs. The same worker may worry about a war that has changed Europe’s security arrangements. Merz has explained why he considers Russia a threat. He still needs to show how Germany can respond without placing an unnecessary burden on its economic future.