Merz’s public satisfaction has fallen to 10 percent while the AfD leads national polling. Germany is committing billions to Ukraine, but economic anxiety is raising questions about the government’s priorities.

Only one in ten Germans surveyed at the end of September was satisfied with Friedrich Merz’s performance as chancellor. The AfD stood at 27 percent. Merz’s CDU/CSU alliance had fallen to 20 percent.

These figures do not prove that Germans oppose Ukraine. They reveal a government making long-term military commitments while confidence in its leadership is collapsing.

At NATO’s July summit in Ankara, allies pledged €70 billion in military equipment, assistance and training for Ukraine during 2026, with at least an equivalent amount for 2027. The two-year commitment is worth at least €140 billion.

Merz has to explain why Germany must help Ukraine, how much Germans will be expected to pay and what political outcome the spending is supposed to achieve.

Merz’s 10 Percent Problem

The ARD-DeutschlandTrend survey, conducted between 28 and 30 September 2026, questioned 1,303 eligible voters. About half feared they would be unable to maintain their living standards. Three-quarters considered government efforts to reduce high energy prices insufficient.

German manufacturers face high operating costs and intense international competition. Households have experienced pressure from energy bills and everyday expenses. Germany is also increasing its military commitments.

Merz argues that stronger European defences are necessary because Russia threatens continental security. Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. German leaders cannot assume European security will take care of itself.

But a government asking citizens to accept difficult economic reforms must explain why large military commitments remain affordable. More than half of those surveyed worried Russia could attack other European countries. Fear of Russia and dissatisfaction with Merz exist within the same electorate.

Why the AfD Is Benefiting

The AfD criticises sanctions and military assistance to Ukraine while advocating renewed diplomatic engagement with Moscow. For some voters, the appeal is economic. They remember Germany’s dependence on relatively inexpensive Russian energy and see factories under pressure.

Its growing popularity cannot be explained by Ukraine alone. Immigration remains central to its appeal. Distrust of established parties also matters.

A September ARD survey found that more than half of respondents in eastern Germany believed German support for Ukraine had gone too far. Nationally, more than four in ten shared that view. The regional difference reflects distinct historical experiences and political conditions.

It would be careless to assume every AfD voter wants closer relations with Moscow. Nor does criticism of military assistance automatically amount to support for Russia’s invasion.

The AfD presents negotiations as an alternative to confrontation. Yet it must explain what would prevent Russia from attacking Ukraine again after a ceasefire. A demand for peace is not the same as a workable security agreement.

Where Germany’s Ukraine Money Goes

In October 2026, the Kiel Institute for the World Economy examined the German government’s approximately €100 billion in support provided or earmarked for Ukraine. The headline combined assistance to Ukraine, expenditure inside Germany and future commitments.

• Actual bilateral assistance to Ukraine, as classified by Kiel: €41.7 billion.
• Spending inside Germany, largely related to Ukrainian refugees: €35.9 billion.
• Future military commitments: €22 billion.

The rounded figures reflect Kiel’s accounting method. The €41.7 billion includes military assistance, not simply cash transferred to Kyiv. Equipment purchased from German manufacturers can still constitute aid delivered to Ukraine.

Supporting refugees in Germany is legitimate expenditure, but it differs from transferring resources to Ukraine. Future commitments also differ from completed deliveries.

The Kiel Institute reported that Germany stopped publishing detailed information about military aid in June 2025, making independent scrutiny more difficult. Operational secrecy has a purpose, but taxpayers still need clear public accounting.

What about German weapons manufacturers?

Rheinmetall and other defence companies have benefited from Europe’s expanding procurement. Governments place orders; manufacturers increase production. Some equipment goes to Ukraine, while other purchases strengthen European forces.

That does not prove defence companies are prolonging the war for profit. Russia’s invasion created demand for military equipment, and European governments also want to rebuild stockpiles.

Still, which manufacturers receive contracts? How are prices determined? How much production serves Ukraine, and how much remains in Germany?

A euro spent on defence is not automatically a euro taken from hospitals or pensions. Yet long-term military commitments require choices about taxation, borrowing and other expenditure. Merz needs to explain them.

Can Military Spending Deliver Peace?

A Ukrainian woman whose interview prompted this investigation described war as something many Western observers understand only through television. Her account was emotional, but her central observation deserves attention: people discussing military strategy rarely experience what soldiers and civilians endure.

For Ukrainians, the consequences include destroyed homes, displacement and the loss of relatives. I find it difficult to accept arguments that treat another year of war as a routine budgetary decision.

Yet ending the fighting presents a serious problem. Russia has occupied Ukrainian territory and shown its willingness to use military force. A ceasefire without credible safeguards could leave Ukraine vulnerable to another offensive.

Military assistance may strengthen Kyiv’s negotiating position. But Berlin should explain how that assistance fits into a political settlement. Would a ceasefire require international monitoring? What guarantees would protect Ukraine? How would Europe respond to another Russian attack?

Russia would have to accept terms Ukraine could regard as sufficiently secure. The difficulty of negotiations does not justify abandoning diplomacy. Nor should the desire for peace become an argument for forcing Ukraine to accept terms against its will.

The Political Price for Merz

Merz faces voters who worry about Russian aggression but also fear economic decline. Some support continued military assistance. Others believe Germany has already done too much. Many want their government to address domestic problems more effectively.

The AfD benefits from dissatisfaction, but its polling lead does not establish that most Germans support its proposed approach to Moscow. The October figures measure voting intentions and satisfaction, not a referendum on Ukraine policy.

Merz should not treat criticism of military spending as sympathy for Russia. Nor should he assume that describing Russia as a threat will persuade voters to accept every defence commitment.

Germany can continue helping Ukraine while distinguishing what it has delivered, what it has spent domestically and what remains a future promise. It can strengthen its military while explaining the costs. It can pursue diplomacy without pretending negotiations alone remove the risk of another invasion.

Only 10 percent of surveyed Germans were satisfied with Merz’s performance. The AfD stood seven points ahead of his alliance. Those figures do not tell us whether Germans want a different settlement with Russia. They do show how little confidence Merz commands while asking the country to accept costly security decisions.

His government has explained why Russia is dangerous. It has been less successful at convincing Germans it can manage the consequences.

Sources

• ARD-DeutschlandTrend, October 2026
• Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Ukraine Support Tracker
• NATO Ankara Summit Declaration