Some Jewish voters support Germany’s AfD. Some Europeans with immigrant backgrounds favour parties that want tougher immigration controls. Their choices are not always what political commentators expect.
Two readers responded to my recent article about Europe’s far right and its alliances with Jewish communities.
One called these alliances a scam. The other argued that nationalist movements simply change their enemies when circumstances make the old ones less useful.
I understood their suspicion. Europe’s far-right parties have political histories that cannot be erased by declarations of friendship with Israel.
But their comments left me thinking about the people who voluntarily enter these alliances.
Why would a Jewish German support a party that prominent Jewish organisations consider dangerous? Why would someone whose family migrated to Europe vote for politicians promising to restrict immigration?
From Karachi, these choices can look contradictory. Yet I have lived long enough to know that people rarely organise their political beliefs as neatly as commentators organise them.
I began with a small gathering in Wiesbaden in October 2018.
Twenty-Four Jews Walk Into an AfD Meeting
On October 7, 2018, a group of 24 people established an organisation called Juden in der AfD, or Jews in the AfD.
The meeting took place in Wiesbaden, Germany.
Vera Kosova was elected chairperson. Wolfgang Fuhl and Artur Abramovych became deputy chairs.
The numbers were tiny. Germany’s Jewish community was much larger, and the new organisation had no mandate to represent it.
Outside the meeting, Jewish protesters were making their opposition clear.
The Jewish Students Union had organised a demonstration in Frankfurt. About 250 people attended, according to police figures reported by the German Jewish newspaper Jüdische Allgemeine.
Forty-two Jewish organisations had joined a statement rejecting the AfD and its proposed Jewish faction.
Contemporary reporting recorded the dispute.
The opposition was not merely symbolic.
Jewish representatives pointed to the AfD’s association with right-wing extremism and its controversies over Germany’s Nazi past. They also raised concerns about the implications of its positions on religious practices such as circumcision and ritual slaughter.
Yet the Jewish members inside the AfD believed they had reasons to be there.
Artur Abramovych offered a particularly revealing explanation.
In interviews examined by researcher Emma Rosenberg, he described himself as a Zionist Jew who considered the AfD more sympathetic to his concerns than parties on the left.
He regarded militant Islam as a serious threat to Jewish life. He also believed established German parties had failed to confront that threat adequately.
Rosenberg’s 2023 Cambridge University Press study examines Abramovych’s statements alongside the AfD’s wider political messaging.
One part of his interview troubled me.
Abramovych also defended the idea that Germany suffered from an excessive culture of guilt about the Holocaust, a position associated with nationalist criticism of Germany’s remembrance culture.
His Jewish identity had not prevented him from adopting an argument that other Jewish Germans considered deeply offensive.
I cannot dismiss him as someone unaware of his own religious history. Nor can I assume that his support for the AfD made the party safe for Jewish citizens.
Josef Schuster, president of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, rejected Jewish involvement with the AfD in a September 2018 statement.
Schuster viewed the party as a danger. Abramovych saw it as a possible protector.
Both men were Jewish. Their political judgments were far apart.
I examined the AfD’s relationship with Jewish organisations in my earlier article, Europe’s Far Right Says It Protects Jews. Why Do Jewish Leaders Distrust It?.
That article concentrated on what nationalist parties gain when they present themselves as defenders of Jews.
The Wiesbaden meeting raises a different question. What do their minority supporters believe they will gain?
The Six Percent That Deserves Attention
Researchers Samira Azabar, Saskia Glas, Nella Geurts and Michael Savelkoul examined this question across Europe.
Their study, published online in November 2025 in the journal Politics, used ten rounds of European Social Survey data collected between 2004 and 2023.
The researchers studied people from ethno-religious minority backgrounds in 28 European countries.
Their broader descriptive sample included 31,866 respondents who were eligible to vote, including people who had not voted.
Only about 6 percent reported having voted for a populist radical-right party.
The figure needs careful handling.
It does not mean 6 percent of all minority voters supported the far right in a particular European election. The study combined survey responses collected over two decades in countries with different political systems.
The researchers used a smaller sample of 21,043 respondents with the required information for their main statistical models.
Even with those qualifications, the overall finding matters.
Minority support for these parties was limited. The researchers found particularly low support among Muslims and respondents with roots in Muslim-majority countries or the Global South.
People from less directly targeted minority backgrounds were generally more likely to support the radical right.
The study, Understanding Unlikely Alliances in Europe, also examined why people made these choices.
Respondents with stronger anti-immigration attitudes were more likely to support radical-right parties. Euroscepticism and preferences for stronger political authority were associated with support as well.
These relationships resembled patterns researchers had already identified among majority populations.
But the study did not find that the usual explanations worked equally well for everyone.
Education and employment status, for example, showed limited or inconsistent associations within minority populations.
That finding caught my attention.
We often explain support for nationalist parties through economic insecurity. The familiar story is that people who feel left behind become attracted to politicians promising to restore national strength.
Economic concerns can matter. The European evidence, however, does not justify treating minority supporters of the far right as one group of economically frustrated voters.
Their political preferences are more varied.
A person with an immigrant background may oppose further immigration because they believe it creates pressure on public services. Another may care more about national sovereignty or prefer stricter social rules.
These are possible motivations, not assumptions we can make about every individual.
The researchers found that minority voters were not politically interchangeable.
That sounds simple. Public discussions often proceed as though it were not true.
Someone born into a minority community may be expected to support progressive immigration policies. If they vote differently, commentators sometimes accuse them of betraying their own people.
I find that explanation unsatisfactory.
A vote can be mistaken without being irrational. It can also reflect political priorities that differ from those outsiders expect a person to hold.
To understand those priorities, I turned to Germany’s voters with family connections to the former Soviet Union.
A Family Arrives in Germany. Its Politics Do Not Stay the Same
For many years, ethnic Germans who returned from the Soviet Union and its successor states were regarded as reliable supporters of Germany’s Christian Democratic parties.
Their experience was different from that of many other migrants.
German law recognised the ancestry of ethnic German returnees, known as Aussiedler and Spätaussiedler. Many had families that had lived outside Germany for generations.
They arrived with migration histories, but also with claims to German belonging based on their ancestry.
Other migrants from the former Soviet Union had different legal routes and family histories. Jewish migrants formed another distinct group.
These populations should not be treated as interchangeable.
Their voting preferences nevertheless provide an interesting example of political change.
Félix Krawatzek, a researcher at Berlin’s Centre for East European and International Studies, known as ZOiS, examined these changes in a report published on February 12, 2025.
The underlying survey was conducted during summer 2024 as part of the MoveMeRU research project.
It included 2,080 respondents overall, of whom 420 had Russian backgrounds.
Krawatzek found that the traditional preference for the CDU/CSU had weakened among parts of the population with Russian family connections.
The AfD and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance, or BSW, had attracted support.
Russia’s war against Ukraine formed an important part of the political debate.
Some respondents opposed Germany’s sanctions on Russia or were attracted by parties that questioned the country’s approach to Moscow.
The AfD’s criticism of sanctions appealed to parts of this electorate. BSW also benefited from dissatisfaction with established parties.
The ZOiS findings are based on stated political preferences and voting intentions, not a complete record of votes cast in the February 2025 federal election.
They cannot tell us how every German voter with Russian roots behaved.
But they reveal something that the usual immigration debate misses.
A voter whose family migrated to Germany may support the AfD because of its position on Russia rather than its immigration policies.
The voter is still choosing a party whose programme extends well beyond Russia.
I find the distinction important.
Political support rarely means agreement with every policy. People decide which issues matter most to them and accept disagreements on others.
Sometimes those compromises are uncomfortable.
I explored the AfD’s wider political influence in Europe Built a Firewall Against the Far Right. The Politics Crossed It Anyway.
The experience of voters with Russian backgrounds adds another dimension. Their political choices cannot be explained solely through the language of immigration.
France brings the argument closer to Jewish politics
Claude Dargent, a researcher associated with Sciences Po’s CEVIPOF, examined the relationship between religious affiliation and voting in France’s 2024 parliamentary elections.
His research note appeared in February 2026.
In the survey, roughly four in ten respondents who identified as Jewish reported voting for far-right candidates or their allies during the first round.
The corresponding share was substantially lower among Muslim respondents.
At first sight, the Jewish figure seems remarkable, particularly given the history of France’s National Rally.
But a detail in the research changes how confidently we can interpret it.
Only 63 Jewish respondents reported a vote in the relevant survey.
That is a small sample. A few different responses could have changed the percentage noticeably.
Dargent himself warned against treating the result as a settled national trend.
The CEVIPOF paper suggests that support for the far right may be becoming more acceptable among some French Jewish voters.
It does not establish how all French Jews voted.
The possible political shift deserves investigation, particularly after October 7, 2023, and the accompanying rise in antisemitic incidents.
Yet the survey alone cannot explain each respondent’s motive.
Some may have prioritised security. Others may have held conservative views unrelated to religion.
A survey showing a voting preference does not automatically tell us why a person made that choice.
What Happens When You Begin to Feel You Belong?
I think the question of belonging deserves more attention.
Imagine someone whose parents migrated to Germany several decades ago.
That person attended German schools and speaks German as a first language. Their children have grown up in the same society.
Why should they continue to understand themselves primarily through their family’s migration history?
They might consider themselves German and view immigration through the same political concerns as their neighbours.
Such a person could support restrictions on future immigration without believing those restrictions should apply to their own family.
The reasoning may appear inconsistent to others.
But the voter may distinguish between established citizens and new arrivals.
Sanne van Oosten examined related questions in a study published in January 2025 by the European Center for Populism Studies.
The research surveyed 3,058 people in France, Germany and the Netherlands between March and August 2020.
It included respondents from minority and majority backgrounds.
Rather than relying on actual ballots cast, the study asked people about their willingness to vote for National Rally in France, the AfD in Germany and Geert Wilders’s Party for Freedom in the Netherlands.
That distinction is essential.
A person who says they might consider a party has not necessarily voted for it.
Van Oosten found that negative attitudes towards immigration were associated with greater willingness to support these parties.
She also found that attachment to one’s own group and feelings of national belonging helped explain support. Their importance differed across countries.
In France and Germany, measures of ethnocentrism were particularly relevant. In the Netherlands, feeling accepted as Dutch was strongly associated with willingness to support Wilders’s party.
Her research on in-group favouritism provides a useful explanation for some apparently contradictory political choices.
The survey predates the Hamas-led attacks of October 2023 and the political arguments that followed. We cannot use it to explain voting responses to those later events.
Still, it identifies a problem with the assumption that minority voters must always think of themselves as outsiders.
Some do not.
They consider themselves established members of the nation. They may also share nationalist attitudes towards newcomers.
There is a complication, of course.
Feeling that one belongs does not guarantee that others accept that belonging.
A voter may identify completely with Germany while encountering discrimination because of their family name or religious background.
A party may welcome that person’s vote without abandoning policies that other members of the same minority consider threatening.
Such tensions are not unique to Germany.
They are part of the difficulty of building political coalitions in societies where ancestry and citizenship do not always produce the same sense of national identity.
The Vote Is a Choice. It Also Has Consequences.
I began this investigation because two readers questioned the sincerity of alliances between Europe’s far right and Jewish communities.
Their concern remains legitimate.
Some nationalist parties have attempted to improve their public image by embracing Jewish supporters and presenting themselves as defenders of Israel.
Political researchers have documented examples in which that support becomes conditional when Jewish leaders disagree with those parties.
But calling every minority supporter a victim of manipulation would be another mistake.
The research shows people making political choices according to their own priorities.
Some minority voters share conservative social attitudes. Others oppose immigration or disagree with established parties over foreign policy.
These preferences may attract them to the radical right even when other members of their communities reject those parties.
That does not absolve them of responsibility for their choices.
A voter may support the AfD because of its position on Russia while disapproving of parts of its immigration programme. The ballot still gives support to the party as a whole.
I have discussed that distinction before in Not in My Name: Why Must Jews Answer for Israel and Muslims Answer for Terrorism?.
Political responsibility should follow what people choose to support and do, rather than being assigned to them merely because of their religion.
For minority voters, that principle cuts both ways.
They should not be expected to follow a prescribed political position simply because of their ancestry. But their political choices remain open to criticism, just like anyone else’s.
I keep thinking about the Wiesbaden meeting in October 2018.
Twenty-four Jewish AfD members gathered to establish their own political organisation. Jewish protesters outside opposed the initiative. Leading Jewish institutions warned against the party.
Abramovych believed the AfD could protect Jewish life. Schuster considered the party a danger to it.
They had examined the same political movement and reached opposing judgments.
The argument between them was not about whether Jewish people understood their history. It concerned the kind of political future each side was prepared to trust.
I am still not convinced that either the language of betrayal or the accusation of a political scam can explain that disagreement.
Both leave too much of the actual voting decision unexplored.
