The renewed Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia revive a question Pakistan never properly settled: what did religious leaders say when Saudi-led aircraft were bombing Yemen?

On 8 October 2016, mourners gathered in a hall in Sana’a, Yemen. Saudi-led coalition aircraft struck the gathering. Human Rights Watch reported at least 100 people killed and more than 500 injured, and described the attack as an apparent war crime. The funeral was not a battlefield. Its investigation raised questions that remain unresolved in Pakistan’s religious debate.

In October 2026, Houthi attacks on Saudi airports have again killed civilians. Condemnation is warranted. But I want to revisit what Pakistani religious organisations demanded when Saudi aircraft were bombing Yemen. Did those who insisted on military support for Riyadh show comparable concern for Yemen’s civilians?

The war that devastated Yemen

Saudi Arabia launched its intervention in March 2015 to restore Yemen’s internationally recognised government after Houthi forces seized Sana’a and expanded their control. The campaign reached far beyond military targets. Investigators documented attacks on civilian economic infrastructure, while import restrictions, insecurity and damage to ports disrupted supplies in a country dependent on imported food and fuel.

The restrictions were not a complete embargo on every shipment. Commercial imports continued at times, often under difficult conditions. But the combined effect of airstrikes and restrictions fell heavily on ordinary households. The Houthis and allied forces also committed abuses, including attacks affecting civilians. Their conduct does not excuse unlawful coalition strikes. Each side is responsible for its own operations.

Pakistani clerics and the 2015 parliamentary decision

Saudi Arabia sought Pakistani military support. Parliament debated the request and on 10 April 2015 adopted a resolution calling for neutrality in Yemen and diplomatic efforts to end the conflict. It also pledged support for Saudi territorial integrity and the holy sites if threatened. That was a deliberate distinction between Saudi defence and participation in Yemen’s civil war.

Several clerics opposed the resolution. Dawn reported that Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat leader Muhammad Ahmad Ludhianvi demanded unconditional support for Saudi Arabia at an Islamabad rally. Other speakers urged Pakistan to send troops. The statements establish public mobilisation in favour of Riyadh. They do not prove every cleric held the same view, or that those speakers never later criticised coalition attacks.

Pakistan had reasons for caution. Saudi Arabia was an important economic and security partner, but joining the war risked worsening regional and sectarian tensions. Parliament’s resolution recognised the kingdom’s security concerns without giving its military campaign a blank cheque. I examined the later strain on that distinction in my analysis of Pakistan’s Saudi defence commitments.

The attacks of October 2026

The human cost of the latest Houthi attacks is documented. Reuters reported that a strike on Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport on 10 October killed 13 people and wounded more than 300. A separate attack the following day killed a Pakistani resident and injured 11 people, according to Saudi authorities. Reuters’ account also described disrupted flights and further warnings from the Houthis.

Pakistan joined other regional governments in condemning the attacks. That position is not inconsistent with concern for Yemenis killed by Saudi-led strikes. International humanitarian law protects civilians regardless of which side attacks them. An airport is not automatically a lawful military target, and an armed group’s claim of retaliation does not remove its obligations.

Religious solidarity and political power

Saudi Arabia’s role as home to Makkah and Madinah gives it special importance to Muslims. That religious importance does not turn every Saudi government military decision into an Islamic obligation. The 2015 speeches show how defence of the holy sites entered a debate about a campaign inside Yemen. Those are different questions.

For more background on the movement itself, see my examination of the Houthi name and Yemen’s media framing. The struggle also involves the Red Sea trade route, explored in my Bab el-Mandeb analysis. None of these strategic interests makes civilian deaths less important.

What did they say when Yemenis died?

The evidence does not justify saying that all Pakistani religious scholars were silent. A responsible investigation would compare named organisations’ sermons, rallies and statements across the years. We have clear evidence that some demanded support for Saudi Arabia in April 2015. The next question is what those organisations said as investigators documented civilian casualties from coalition operations.

I would put the question directly to the leaders who opposed Pakistan’s neutrality: when Saudi-led bombs struck Yemeni civilians, did you condemn those attacks with the same urgency that you now demand for attacks on Saudi Arabia? Their public record, not assumptions about their motives, should supply the answer.

Featured image: AI-generated editorial illustration, not a photograph of a specific attack.