Bangladesh – Cross-Border Currents

India’s Role in the Mukti Bahini: Freedom or a License to Kill?

“India gave us more than just weapons; it gave us hope. If they hadn’t helped us, our fight against Pakistan’s genocide might have been a whisper in the wind. — Lt. Col. Quazi Sajjad Ali Zahir, a Bangladeshi war veteran, 2020

The Bangladesh Liberation War started in 1971. The Bengali people of East Pakistan fought for freedom from the harsh rule of West Pakistan. The Mukti Bahini led the way in this fight. They were a group of Bengali soldiers, paramilitary, and civilians who fought as guerrillas. India’s involvement—giving training, weapons, and a safe place to stay—was key to Pakistan’s surrender on December 16, 1971. But was India’s help an act of selfless humanitarian intervention, or did it start a rebellion that killed innocent people? This study looks into the moral and strategic issues and asks whether India’s help led to freedom or chaos.

A Crisis on India’s Doorstep: Humanitarian and Strategic Reasons

The war started on March 25, 1971. Pakistan initiated Operation Searchlight with a brutal attack on Bengali civilians. They also targeted intellectuals and supporters of the Awami League. The International Commission of Jurists reported that between 300,000 and 3 million people died. Furthermore, 200,000 to 400,000 women were raped. Additionally, up to 10 million people fled to India. This was not a far-off war for India. Refugees flooded into West Bengal and Assam, putting a strain on resources and raising fears of communal unrest.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi led India’s quick response. By April 1971, India let refugees in and started helping the Mukti Bahini, which means “freedom fighters” in Bengali. This group was made up of soldiers who had left the army and civilian volunteers led by Colonel M.A.G. Osmani. India’s Eastern Command trained fighters in camps in Assam, West Bengal, and Tripura. They gave them rifles, carbines, and artillery that had been taken from Pakistan. The Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and the Special Security Bureau (SSB) secretly aided by teaching guerrilla tactics. They also taught how to gather intelligence. By November, the Mukti Bahini had 70,000 regular soldiers and 50,000 guerrillas, all of which were paid for by India.

India’s reasons were a mix of caring and planning. The refugee crisis needed action, but it was a smart move to weaken Pakistan, which has been a rival since 1947. If Pakistan were split up, it would be less of a threat to India’s western border. It would also counter China’s support for Islamabad. As historian Gary Bass wrote in The Blood Telegram, India was also afraid of a Bengali resistance. This resistance, led by communists, could join forces with Naxalite rebels inside its borders. India made sure that Bangladesh was pro-India by supporting the Awami League’s temporary government. Gandhi said the intervention was for humanitarian reasons, but geopolitics shaped the plan.

Summary: India helped the Mukti Bahini because of a refugee crisis and its own strategic interests. It did this by giving them humanitarian aid while also trying to weaken Pakistan. This dual motive creates confusion. It is hard to determine if India cared more about Bengali lives or its own power in the region.

The Mukti Bahini’s Campaign: Successes and Mistakes

The Mukti Bahini fought a never-ending guerrilla war against Pakistani military bases, bridges, and supply lines. Operation Jackpot was a naval commando mission. It sank more than 100,000 tonnes of Pakistani ships. This made it hard for them to move goods. By December, when India officially joined the war, the Mukti Bahini had freed 80% of Bangladesh’s land, making victory possible.

But the campaign had a bad side. Some Mukti Bahini units attacked Bihari communities. These are Urdu-speaking Muslims who moved to Pakistan from India during the partition in 1947. Biharis, who were often thought to be loyal to Pakistan, were brutally punished. Lawrence Lifschultz’s 1974 book Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution says that between 1,000 and 150,000 Biharis died. Massacres happened in places like Jessore and Khulna. The Razakars were militias made up of pro-Pakistan Bengalis and Biharis. They perpetuated the violence by killing Bengalis in horrible ways. An example is the Dhaka University killings. Survivors’ stories reveal the brutality. For instance, in a 2001 Dawn interview, Noor Jahan shared that Mukti Bahini fighters burned down Bihari homes. Families were inside these homes.

Did India pay for these terrible things? There is no proof that India told its troops to attack civilians. General Manekshaw’s memoirs discuss Indian training logs. These logs were mostly about military goals like ambushes, sabotage, and battles such as Gazipur. But India’s weapons and open borders gave the Mukti Bahini freedom. In an uncontrollable war, rogue units acted on their own. Susan Brownmiller’s book Against Our Will talks about rape by all sides, including Mukti Bahini fighters, against Bihari women. This is similar to what the Pakistani army did.

Some Pakistani historians, like Yasmin Saikia, claim that India intentionally stoked ethnic violence. She discusses this in Women, War, and the Making of Bangladesh. They suggest it was done to make Pakistan even less stable. This ignores the fact that the war started because of Pakistan’s genocide. The Mukti Bahini was made up of ordinary people. This made it unlikely that India would be able to control everything from one place. Still, India’s failure to stop excesses makes it indirectly responsible.

Proxy wars and what happened after them in the past

India’s backing of the Mukti Bahini is similar to other proxy wars. The U.S. gave $5 billion to the Afghan mujahideen through Pakistan’s ISI to fight the Soviets in the 1980s. This led to the rise of groups like al-Qaeda. India’s support for the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka in the 1980s made the rebels stronger. Later, the rebels attacked Indian peacekeepers. India’s help in Bangladesh led to independence, but it also destroyed Bihari communities. This is similar to what happened in Syria, where U.S.-backed rebels killed Alawite civilians, according to Human Rights Watch in 2013.

In Rwanda after 1994, on the other hand, World Bank aid was linked to changes in how the government worked. This made militia violence go down. In 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh, Srinath Raghavan says that India’s support didn’t have these kinds of conditions. The crisis was so urgent. Additionally, Pakistan was being aggressive. The result was a strategic win, but a moral mess.

Summary: Historical proxy wars show that giving weapons to rebels often causes civilians to suffer in ways that weren’t planned. India’s experience in 1971 shows how hard it is to find a balance between taking quick action and being responsible.

The Moral and Strategic Reckoning

Did India help the Mukti Bahini do bad things? Yes, in a way. India triggered a wave it couldn’t fully control by distributing weapons to a wide range of people. This included soldiers, students, and civilians. But Bass says that Pakistan’s genocide was the main cause of the war. Ninety thousand troops killed Bengalis without regard for their lives. Without India’s intervention, the death toll could have been higher, and Bangladesh’s independence delayed or denied.

The Bihari tragedy needs people to be held responsible. A 2023 UNHCR report says that 300,000 Biharis are still stateless in Bangladeshi camps today. Dhaka’s story of liberation ignores their situation. India didn’t push for justice for Mukti Bahini crimes because it wanted to protect Bangladesh’s independence. The Awami League in Bangladesh didn’t either. The Hamoodur Rahman Commission recorded a 1972 testimony from Bihari survivor Mohammad Alam. In his testimony, he said that Mukti Bahini fighters killed his brothers. This story is similar to many other undocumented accounts.

Counterargument: People who support India, like retired General Jacob in Surrender at Dacca, claim it was unrealistic for India to monitor every Mukti Bahini unit. Monitoring every Mukti Bahini unit was deemed unrealistic. This was especially true during a genocide. India’s top priority was to stop Pakistan’s killing, not to micromanage a resistance. This point of view is useful, but it ignores the human cost of giving too much aid.

Summary: India had to help stop genocide for moral reasons, but it didn’t do anything about the Mukti Bahini’s wrongdoings, which left a legacy of unresolved complaints. The Bihari question is still a problem with the war’s victory.

What’s at stake in South Asia right now?

The war in 1971 is still a hot topic. Veterans in Bangladesh, like Commodore Abdul Wahed Chowdhury, who was quoted in a 2021 Daily Star op-ed, say that India is a “great neighbour.” Stories of Indian subversion in Pakistan help shape policies like the country’s nuclear buildup after 1971. Raghavan says that India’s role solidified its dominance in the region, but it also left a complicated legacy: a humanitarian victory marred by the chaos of proxy wars.

The bigger question is whether any country can support a rebellion without getting blood on its hands. The problems in South Asia right now, like Kashmir and Afghanistan, are similar to what happened in 1971. If India or other powerful countries give money to insurgents today, will they have the same successes and failures as the Mukti Bahini? What happens when the line between liberator and enabler gets blurry? The stakes are lives, borders, and a region that is always on edge.

Important Dates in the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War

Pakistan starts Operation Searchlight on March 25, 1971, and kills thousands.

In April 1971, India lets refugees in, and the Mukti Bahini group forms.

Operation Jackpot by Mukti Bahini messes up Pakistani logistics from July to November 1971.

December 3–16, 1971: India enters the war, and Pakistan gives up.

After the war, the Bihari massacres killed between 1,000 and 150,000 people, and 300,000 people are still without a country.
Sources: Gary Bass, the International Commission of Jurists, and the UNHCR

Why India Sees a Conspiracy in US-Backed Moves—and Why Washington Might Not Care

India is shouting into the wind. On May 9, 2025, the International Monetary Fund, with U.S. backing, approved a $1.4 billion loan to Pakistan. Five days later, a $1.3 billion loan went to Bangladesh. On May 14 and 15, the U.S. sold $225 million worth of advanced AMRAAM missiles to Turkey. To New Delhi, these moves aren’t isolated. They’re a pattern—an anti-India trifecta that emboldens its adversaries. Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Turkey, each tied to India’s security nightmares, are reaping Western rewards. India’s warnings about terrorism, regional instability, and encirclement fall on deaf ears. Why does India see these as anti-India? And why does the U.S., the world’s hegemon, seem unmoved by India’s protests?

The answer lies in a brutal truth: geopolitics isn’t about fairness. It’s about leverage, interests, and cold calculation. India’s concerns are real, but Washington’s priorities are elsewhere. Let’s unpack the moves, India’s fears, and the deeper game at play.

The Pakistan Loan: Fueling a Rival or Stabilizing a Powder Keg?

India’s objection to the $1.4 billion IMF loan to Pakistan is loud and clear: Pakistan misuses funds. New Delhi points to history. In the 1980s, U.S. aid during the Afghan jihad flowed into Pakistan’s military and, indirectly, its proxy networks. Today, India alleges Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence funnels resources to groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, which target India. The 2008 Mumbai attacks, killing 166, still burn in India’s memory. A 2024 Indian Ministry of External Affairs report claimed Pakistan’s defense budget, bloated by foreign aid, grew 15% since 2020, with “credible evidence” of terror financing.

But the U.S. sees Pakistan differently. It’s a nuclear-armed state teetering on economic collapse. Default risks destabilizing a nation of 240 million, potentially unleashing chaos near Afghanistan and Iran. The IMF loan, backed by Washington, aims to stabilize Pakistan’s economy, not its military. U.S. officials argue that a broke Pakistan is more dangerous than a funded one. India’s counterargument—that funds free up resources for mischief—gets traction in New Delhi but not in D.C. Why? Because Pakistan’s utility as a counterweight to China outweighs India’s complaints. The U.S. needs Pakistan’s cooperation on Afghanistan and Central Asia, even if it means ignoring India’s red flags.

Bangladesh’s Loan: Rewarding Anti-India Posturing?

The $1.3 billion IMF loan to Bangladesh stings India more. Under Prime Minister Younus, Dhaka has veered from India’s orbit. Younus’s cozying up to Pakistan and China, coupled with her provocative remarks about India’s northeastern states, sets off alarms. In a March 2025 speech, he hinted at “supporting self-determination” in Assam, a dog whistle for separatists. India sees the loan as a Western pat on the back for Bangladesh’s anti-India turn. Worse, it suspects the funds will bolster Dhaka’s military, already buying Chinese submarines and Pakistani drones.

Yet, the U.S. and IMF have their own logic. Bangladesh’s economy, battered by 2024’s global trade slowdown, risks spiraling. With 170 million people and a strategic location in the Bay of Bengal, a stable Bangladesh matters. The U.S. also sees Dhaka as a hedge against China’s Belt and Road dominance. Younus’s anti-India rhetoric? Irrelevant to Washington, which prioritizes maritime security and countering Beijing. India’s fear of encirclement—by a China-aligned Bangladesh and Pakistan—gets drowned out by America’s Indo-Pacific chessboard. History repeats: in the 1970s, U.S. aid to Bangladesh ignored India’s concerns about Dhaka’s tilt toward Pakistan. Today, the pattern holds.

Turkey’s Missiles: A Backdoor Boost to Pakistan?

The U.S. sale of AMRAAM missiles to Turkey is the final jab. Turkey’s support for Pakistan is no secret. During India’s 2023 Operation Synindor, Turkish-supplied drones aided Pakistan’s border skirmishes. The $225 million deal, finalized on May 15, 2025, equips Turkey’s air force with advanced weaponry. India fears these could end up in Pakistan’s hands, given Ankara’s history of transferring tech to Islamabad. A 2022 SIPRI report noted Turkey’s role in supplying Pakistan’s air force with targeting pods used against Indian positions.

Washington’s rationale is straightforward: Turkey, a NATO ally, needs modern arms to counter Russia and Iran. The U.S. also wants to keep Ankara from drifting toward Moscow. But this ignores India’s perspective. Turkey’s Islamist-leaning government under Erdogan openly backs Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir, a neuralgic issue for India. The missile sale, to New Delhi, isn’t just about Turkey—it’s a signal that the U.S. will arm Pakistan’s allies without restraint. Historical precedent looms: in the 1990s, U.S. F-16 sales to Pakistan sparked Indian outrage, yet Washington pressed ahead. The same dynamic persists.

Why India’s Rants Don’t Sway Washington

India’s protests—voiced in diplomatic cables and op-eds in The Hindu—frame these moves as reckless. New Delhi argues they empower a Pakistan-Bangladesh-Turkey axis, indirectly backed by China, that threatens India’s security. The moral case is potent: why fund or arm states that enable terrorism or destabilize South Asia? But morality doesn’t drive geopolitics. The U.S. calculates differently.

First, India’s own rise complicates its pleas. As a Quad member and economic powerhouse, India is a U.S. partner, but not a dependent. Washington expects New Delhi to handle its own backyard. Second, the U.S. prioritizes global flashpoints—China, Russia, Iran—over India’s regional anxieties. Pakistan’s role in counterterrorism, Bangladesh’s strategic ports, and Turkey’s NATO membership outweigh India’s warnings. Third, domestic politics play a part. U.S. defense contractors like Raytheon, which makes AMRAAMs, lobby hard. Economic stabilization via IMF loans also aligns with Biden’s 2025 agenda of global recovery.

History underscores this. In 1981, the U.S. ignored India’s objections to arming Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan War. The pattern held in 2001, when post-9/11 aid to Pakistan flowed despite India’s 2002 Parliament attack by Pakistani proxies. India’s voice, though louder now, still struggles against America’s strategic math.

The Deeper Contradiction: India’s Isolation in a Multipolar World

India’s alarm exposes a paradox. It champions a multipolar world, yet expects U.S. deference to its concerns. This won’t happen. A multipolar order means competing interests, not alignment. The U.S. backs India against China but won’t sacrifice other pawns to soothe New Delhi. Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Turkey aren’t anti-India in Washington’s eyes—they’re tools for broader goals. India’s challenge is to counter this without overreacting. Escalating tensions with Bangladesh or Pakistan risks proving Eunice’s or Islamabad’s narratives right. Alienating the U.S. over Turkey’s missiles could weaken Quad cohesion.

What’s the way forward? India must play the long game. Strengthen its own economy to dwarf Pakistan’s. Deepen ties with Bangladesh’s opposition to counter Younus. Use diplomacy to highlight Turkey’s double-dealing in NATO circles. Above all, India needs to accept a hard truth: the U.S. isn’t its babysitter. It’s a partner with its own agenda.