Israel’s political transition has exposed a difficult question: who decides when military action is necessary, and who can stop it?
On November 12, Benjamin Netanyahu and Gadi Eisenkot sat down for a security briefing in Israel.
Their meeting lasted about two hours. Eisenkot, the former army chief trying to replace Netanyahu as prime minister, had warned against non-urgent military action while Israel remained under a caretaker government.
The warning was significant. Netanyahu had lost his parliamentary majority, but he still controlled the government responsible for national security.
I find this disagreement more revealing than the election result itself.
Israel may be preparing to change its prime minister. Its confrontation with Iran, however, cannot be settled by replacing one politician.
The question is who controls the decisions that could lead to another war.
Netanyahu Lost His Majority, Not His Office
Israel’s October 27 election left the country without a clear governing majority.
Netanyahu’s right-wing and religious bloc secured 53 seats in the 120-member Knesset. The bloc led by Eisenkot won 48. Two Arab-led parties secured another 19 seats.
Neither of the two main blocs could form a government alone.
During consultations with President Isaac Herzog, parties representing 67 lawmakers recommended Eisenkot to form the next government. Netanyahu received 46 recommendations, while seven lawmakers declined to recommend either candidate.
On November 8, Herzog formally gave Eisenkot the mandate.
That decision did not make Eisenkot prime minister.
He has until December 6 to assemble a government, with a possible extension of 14 days. Meanwhile, Netanyahu continues to lead the outgoing administration.
Under Israel’s Basic Law: The Government, an outgoing government remains in office until a new one takes over.
The arrangement prevents a gap in executive authority. It also creates a difficult political situation when the outgoing government has lost its parliamentary majority.
Netanyahu can still exercise substantial national security powers even though a majority of lawmakers recommended someone else to form the government.
That is where Israel’s political transition becomes relevant to Iran.
Can Netanyahu Order Another War?
A caretaker prime minister does not lose the authority to respond to military threats.
But that does not mean he can personally declare war without legal procedures.
Section 40 of Israel’s Basic Law requires a government decision before the country starts a war or undertakes a significant military operation that is almost certain to lead to one.
The government may delegate this authority to an authorised ministerial committee, commonly known as the security cabinet, under conditions established by law.
The law also allows other military actions necessary for national defence and public security.
There is an additional legal complication.
The Israel Democracy Institute explained on November 16 that caretaker governments retain the formal powers of ordinary governments. Judicial decisions nevertheless require them to exercise restraint, especially after an election.
Courts have generally allowed considerable discretion in national security matters.
A caretaker government therefore faces legal and political limits, but those limits do not prevent it from responding to an urgent threat.
The distinction matters.
A military operation might be legally authorised without being strategically wise. Equally, an outgoing government might face a genuine security emergency that cannot wait for coalition negotiations to finish.
The law establishes procedures. It cannot settle every argument about whether military action is necessary.
A Security Briefing Revealed the Political Problem
The November 12 meeting between Netanyahu and Eisenkot brought the issue into public view.
Eisenkot had called for restraint over military action that was not urgent. Defence Minister Israel Katz defended the outgoing government’s authority to make security decisions.
The two political rivals subsequently issued a joint statement confirming that Eisenkot had received a briefing on Israel’s security and diplomatic challenges.
Their disagreement was not simply about Iran.
It concerned the authority of an outgoing government and the responsibilities of a politician who might soon replace it.
Netanyahu has argued that Israel needs a national unity government capable of confronting the Iranian threat.
Eisenkot faces a different calculation. He must assemble a coalition while preparing for the possibility of assuming responsibility for the same security challenges.
Neither politician can ignore Iran.
But they may disagree about the timing of military operations, the risks of escalation and the circumstances in which force should be used.
Those differences deserve examination before anyone concludes that Israeli policy will remain unchanged.
Eisenkot’s Military Record Raises Difficult Questions
Eisenkot is not entering this debate without a military history.
He served as chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces from 2015 to 2019. Earlier, he commanded Israeli forces along the northern front.
His name is associated with the Dahiya Doctrine, which emerged from Israel’s confrontation with Hezbollah in Lebanon.
In 2008, Eisenkot described a policy of using disproportionate force against Lebanese villages from which Hezbollah launched attacks.
Reuters reported his remarks at the time.
The doctrine became controversial because of the destruction it envisaged and the danger to civilian populations. International humanitarian law requires parties to distinguish civilians from combatants and prohibits attacks that are indiscriminate or disproportionate in relation to the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage.
Eisenkot’s statements are therefore relevant when assessing his approach to military force.
But they do not provide a complete account of how he would govern Israel today.
Lebanon in 2008 and Iran in 2026 present different strategic problems.
Iran has a larger military establishment and the capacity to retaliate across the region. A major confrontation could also involve American forces and affect neighbouring countries.
A prime minister considering military action against Iran must assess consequences that extend beyond the immediate target.
Eisenkot’s military background may influence his decisions. It does not prove that he would favour every operation Netanyahu might consider.
Nor does it establish that he would be more restrained.
His actual decisions, if he becomes prime minister, would provide stronger evidence than predictions based solely on his past military statements.
Israel’s Security Institutions Do Not Always Agree
Political commentary often describes Israel’s military and intelligence establishment as though it speaks with one voice.
That assumption deserves scrutiny.
The Israel Defense Forces assess military threats and prepare operational options. Mossad gathers foreign intelligence and conducts covert operations. Political leaders decide how those capabilities should serve national objectives.
These institutions have different responsibilities.
They may agree that Iran presents a serious security challenge while disagreeing about the best response.
An intelligence assessment might support continued surveillance. Military planners might argue that a particular target offers an opportunity for attack.
Political leaders must consider the wider consequences, including the possibility of retaliation.
Institutional disagreements do not necessarily become public. Nor should every anonymous allegation about internal disputes be accepted as fact.
The important point is that a shared assessment of a threat does not automatically produce agreement over military action.
Israel’s security policy emerges from decisions made by people who hold different responsibilities and face different constraints.
The prime minister has considerable influence over those decisions. He does not make them in an institutional vacuum.
Washington Can Shape the Decision
Israel’s relationship with the United States adds another layer of authority and influence.
The American government does not formally approve every Israeli military operation.
Israel remains responsible for its own military decisions.
Yet a sustained confrontation with Iran could depend heavily on American support.
The United States supplies important military assistance and defence equipment to Israel. American diplomatic decisions also affect the international consequences of Israeli operations.
Washington has its own regional interests.
An American president might support pressure on Iran while opposing a particular Israeli operation because of the danger to American forces or regional partners.
An Israeli government could therefore face a situation in which its military commanders consider an attack feasible but Washington considers the consequences unacceptable.
The reverse is possible too. A change in American policy could make a previously rejected option more attractive.
This does not give Washington a formal seat in Israel’s security cabinet.
It gives the United States influence over the circumstances in which Israeli decisions are made.
That influence may matter more than the personal differences between Netanyahu and Eisenkot.
Iran Also Has Choices
There is a weakness in much of the commentary about Israel’s political transition.
Iran often appears as a country waiting to discover what Israel will do next.
Tehran has its own calculations.
Iranian leaders must assess Israeli military capabilities and American intentions. They must also decide how to protect their nuclear facilities and respond to threats against Iranian territory.
Those decisions can affect Israeli calculations.
An Iranian move that Israeli officials interpret as threatening could increase pressure for military action. Diplomatic progress or credible arrangements for monitoring nuclear activities might create opportunities for restraint.
Neither outcome is guaranteed.
A new Israeli prime minister could adopt different language toward Tehran without changing Israel’s underlying concerns about Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes.
Iran, in turn, might remain suspicious of Israeli intentions even after Netanyahu leaves office.
A change in leadership can affect diplomacy. It cannot erase the history of confrontation.
Coalition Politics Could Restrict Eisenkot
Eisenkot’s immediate problem is not military.
It is parliamentary.
His bloc has 48 seats. With support from both Arab-led parties, it could command 67 votes. But several potential partners oppose joining a coalition that depends on those parties.
Negotiations with ultra-Orthodox factions raise another obstacle.
Disagreements over military service exemptions for religious seminary students have complicated efforts to assemble a government.
Eisenkot has also explored the possibility of cooperation with parties from Netanyahu’s political camp.
As of November 18, no governing agreement has emerged.
These domestic disputes matter for foreign policy.
A prime minister leading a fragile coalition must consider whether ministers will support a prolonged military operation and whether the government can survive the political consequences.
A security emergency might encourage rival parties to cooperate. It could also deepen existing divisions.
There is no reliable way to predict the result without examining the circumstances of a particular crisis.
Eisenkot’s political freedom would depend partly on the government he manages to form.
His military experience alone cannot tell us how much freedom he would possess.
The Next Prime Minister Will Inherit the Same Iran Problem
Netanyahu has spent much of his political career warning about Iran’s nuclear ambitions and regional influence.
His departure would change Israel’s political leadership. It would not automatically change the security assessments inherited by his successor.
Eisenkot would receive intelligence briefings prepared by existing institutions. He would work with military commanders responsible for current operations and confront the consequences of previous conflicts.
He would also have to make his own political judgments.
A new government could preserve Israel’s opposition to Iranian nuclear weapons development while changing its approach to military action.
It might seek closer coordination with Washington or establish different conditions for authorising strikes.
The outcome would depend on decisions that have not yet been made.
That is why I hesitate to describe Netanyahu’s possible departure as either a victory for Iran or the beginning of a more dangerous period.
Both claims go further than the evidence permits.
Who Has the Power to Say No?
Israel’s political transition has exposed a question that reaches beyond Netanyahu and Eisenkot.
Who can challenge a decision to use military force?
The security cabinet has legal responsibilities. Military commanders provide professional assessments. The Knesset has oversight powers, while the courts have established principles governing caretaker governments.
Washington can influence the strategic environment without possessing formal authority over Israeli decisions.
Each institution operates within different limits.
The November 12 security briefing showed why those limits matter. An outgoing prime minister and a potential successor were discussing national security while disagreeing about the authority to act during a political transition.
Israel’s next government may continue to regard Iran as a major threat.
That does not settle when force should be used or whether a particular operation would make Israel safer.
The person occupying the prime minister’s office matters. So does the ability of the institutions around him to demand evidence, question assumptions and resist a decision they consider dangerous.
When the next proposal for military action reaches Israel’s security cabinet, the decisive question will not be whether Netanyahu or Eisenkot is sitting at the head of the table.
It will be whether the people around that table can say no.
