The November 13 aviation shutdown exposed a difficult problem. America must replace aging air traffic technology while keeping the existing network safe enough to handle thousands of flights every day.
At approximately 3:30 p.m. Eastern Time on November 13, something went wrong inside the telecommunications network that supports America’s air traffic controllers.
Data began flooding the Federal Aviation Administration’s network. Radio communications and radar feeds became unstable. Within hours, the FAA had ordered a nationwide ground stop.
The problem affected 17 of the country’s 22 major en-route air traffic control centers. Some communications remained available, allowing controllers to guide aircraft already in flight.
By 8:15 p.m., the FAA had stabilized the network and resumed departures. Approximately 3,500 aircraft landed safely during the disruption.
The agency later reported about 1,000 connection attempts every four to five seconds. Investigators identified two possible sources: a radar facility in Amarillo, Texas, and a radio communications site in El Dorado, Arkansas.
A contractor had been replacing communications equipment at the Arkansas site.
I find one detail particularly troubling. A relatively small installation site had become part of a problem affecting much of the national air traffic control network.
The FAA is still investigating exactly how that happened.
But the incident raises a question that deserves more attention than another argument about government spending.
Who checks the technical work before a change goes live on a network that cannot afford to fail?
America’s Air Traffic System Has Been Aging for Decades
The problems did not begin under Donald Trump.
American officials have struggled to modernize air traffic control technology since the 1980s. Some systems still rely on equipment so old that replacement parts are difficult to find.
A September 2024 Government Accountability Office report described the scale of the problem.
Of the FAA’s 138 air traffic control systems, 51 were classified as unsustainable. Another 54 were potentially unsustainable.
That is 105 systems requiring varying degrees of attention.
The problem goes beyond old computers. Air traffic controllers depend on communications links, radar information, and other services that must remain available while aircraft move through controlled airspace.
A broken office computer can wait until morning. A communications failure affecting aircraft cannot.
The FAA has already experienced serious warnings.
In 2023, a failure involving the Notice to Air Missions system triggered a nationwide ground stop. In 2025, telecommunications problems disrupted operations affecting Newark Liberty International Airport.
The Newark incidents were especially revealing. Aging communications infrastructure and inadequate testing of telecommunications links had contributed to operational problems.
Government auditors had reason to worry.
The FAA needed to replace old technology. But replacing it would introduce risks of its own.
What Happened at the Arkansas Installation?
The November 13 incident occurred during work to replace older copper-based telecommunications connections with newer technology.
L3Harris Technologies, the FAA’s network service provider, was carrying out work at the El Dorado communications site, including installing a new router.
According to the FAA’s preliminary account, abnormal network traffic created instability in its Federal Telecommunications Infrastructure network.
The agency identified both El Dorado and Amarillo as possible sources of the excessive traffic.
L3Harris blocked traffic from the two locations, after which the network stabilized. The FAA also disabled the relevant functionality on more than 60 other Juniper routers and paused further installations.
Those actions tell us what officials did to contain the problem.
They do not yet establish precisely why the abnormal traffic began or how it spread through the wider network.
The FAA has emphasized that its older telecommunications infrastructure became unstable. It also distinguishes the routine equipment replacement from its larger modernization initiative.
That distinction is important.
The November incident should not be described as proof that the entire new air traffic control program has failed.
It does, however, expose the difficulty of changing equipment while the existing network remains in operation.
An installation that appears routine at one facility may interact with systems elsewhere.
Engineers must understand those connections before making changes.
The FAA May Have Approved the Work
On November 17, The Washington Post reported something that complicates the effort to place responsibility entirely on L3Harris.
According to a person familiar with the investigation, an FAA official supervised the Arkansas installation, tested the completed work, and approved it.
The report said the communications trouble began about eight minutes after the work was completed.
The source also described an operational risk assessment that had approved the installation.
These details have not been established in a final official investigation. They should be treated as attributed reporting, not as a finding of negligence.
Still, the account raises a serious question.
What did the FAA’s approval actually establish?
Perhaps the new equipment passed the tests required at that location. Perhaps those tests did not reproduce the conditions that later affected the wider network.
We do not yet know.
A technical sign-off has value only when the tests behind it examine the relevant risks.
Consider a network change that works perfectly at one installation site. If the new equipment sends unexpected traffic to other systems, local testing may not reveal the problem.
That possibility does not prove that FAA engineers overlooked a known danger.
It explains why investigators need to examine the testing procedure, the operational risk assessment, and the steps used to return the equipment to its previous configuration.
The government cannot judge a contractor’s performance properly without examining its own role in approving the work.
A Government Audit Had Already Raised Concerns
Two months before the nationwide ground stop, the Government Accountability Office published a report on the FAA’s accelerated modernization program.
The report examined the Brand New Air Traffic Control System initiative, launched in May 2025.
The program aims to replace outdated communications equipment and other systems much faster than earlier plans allowed.
GAO acknowledged that the FAA had made progress.
By May 2026, the agency reported replacing 2,560 of 5,170 aging copper communications connections with fiber-optic cables.
But auditors also found serious weaknesses in how the broader program was being planned.
The FAA had 11,389 individual project schedules supporting 13 modernization programs. Those schedules had not been integrated into a detailed master schedule that coordinated all the work.
It sounds like an administrative problem.
Look more closely.
GAO described plans for technicians to visit a facility in St. Louis in April 2027 to prepare for a voice-switch installation.
Another team planned to return to the same facility in January 2028 for preparation work involving information displays.
The visits were separated by approximately eight months.
A coordinated schedule might allow the FAA to combine some activities or better manage their dependencies. Without that coordination, the agency risks repeated disruption at operating facilities.
The FAA told auditors that its systems integrator was developing a tool to improve scheduling.
GAO reported that the tool was still being tested and that the agency had not established when the scheduling problem would be resolved.
There is no evidence that the missing master schedule caused the November 13 shutdown.
The audit concerns a broader modernization program, while the immediate outage investigation concerns telecommunications equipment and network behavior.
But the findings belong in the same discussion about oversight.
The FAA is managing thousands of technical changes across facilities that must remain operational. It needs reliable ways to coordinate that work and identify dependencies before they create problems.
Why a Small Network Change Can Become a National Problem
Aviation communications depend on connections between equipment at different locations.
A controller may work hundreds of miles from the communications facility supporting a particular radio link. Data must travel through a network before it reaches the people who need it.
That arrangement makes centralized operations possible.
It also creates dependencies that are not obvious from the size or location of an installation site.
A remote facility may look insignificant on a map. Its network connections can still matter to distant control centers.
The November 13 disruption illustrates why engineers must test more than whether a newly installed device turns on and transmits data.
They need to understand what happens when the device sends unexpected traffic or behaves differently from the equipment it replaces.
They must also know whether a fault can be isolated before it affects other facilities.
Backup arrangements deserve the same attention.
The FAA says some radio frequencies and radar feeds remained reliable during the disruption. Controllers used established safety procedures, and aircraft landed safely.
That is important evidence that parts of the system continued to function.
It does not answer every question about the network’s resilience.
Could the abnormal traffic have been contained earlier? Did existing safeguards operate as designed? Were the risks adequately considered before the installation?
Investigators should answer those questions with technical evidence.
Congress should insist that the findings become public to the extent compatible with aviation security.
Another $50.1 Billion Is Now on the Table
Four days after the shutdown, the Trump administration asked Congress for another $50.1 billion for aviation infrastructure.
Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy, FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford, and Office of Management and Budget Director Russell Vought supported the request.
The proposal allocated $10.1 billion to air traffic control modernization.
The remaining $40 billion covered airport infrastructure and terminals, along with regional control centers and control towers.
Some of those investments address longstanding needs.
The FAA’s infrastructure problems are real, and Congress cannot reasonably expect engineers to maintain obsolete equipment indefinitely.
Yet a funding request is not a technical safety assessment.
The November shutdown demonstrates the consequences of an unstable communications network. It does not establish that every proposed construction project should receive immediate approval.
Congress needs to examine each category on its merits.
There is also the question of cost.
The September GAO report found that the FAA had not prepared a comprehensive, well-documented lifecycle cost estimate for its accelerated modernization initiative.
Officials estimated approximately $10.6 billion for the first phase. Auditors found that the estimate excluded government expenses and most future operating costs.
It also omitted the second phase.
The Transportation Department disputed parts of GAO’s assessment, pointing to estimates maintained for individual programs.
GAO maintained that those estimates did not provide the comprehensive picture needed for effective oversight.
The distinction matters because purchasing equipment is only the beginning.
The FAA must operate the systems for years after installation. Maintenance contracts will continue. Equipment will eventually need replacing.
Congress should know the likely cost of those obligations before committing additional public money.
Congress Needs More Than Progress Reports
The FAA has good reasons to accelerate modernization.
Telecommunications providers are retiring older copper services. Maintaining unsupported technology can become increasingly difficult.
Waiting indefinitely carries its own risks.
The question is how the agency manages the transition.
Congress should require the FAA to explain its procedures for approving technical changes to critical communications networks.
That means examining the tests performed before equipment goes live and the authority of officials who approve those changes.
It also means reviewing how the agency responds when equipment behaves unexpectedly.
A practical investigation should establish whether engineers can isolate a faulty device quickly enough to prevent wider disruption.
The FAA should also demonstrate that its modernization schedules account for work occurring at the same facilities.
GAO’s recommendations provide a starting point.
The agency needs a reliable lifecycle cost estimate and an integrated schedule that identifies dependencies among projects.
Neither document will guarantee that a router never malfunctions.
But both can improve the government’s ability to plan complicated work, manage contractors, and recognize risks before they become operational problems.
Contractors should face scrutiny when their equipment or work contributes to failures.
Government approval procedures deserve equal scrutiny.
The Hardest Part Is Keeping the Old System Running
There is a temptation to treat the November shutdown as another example of Washington incompetence.
That explanation is politically convenient. It is also incomplete.
The FAA faces a difficult engineering problem.
It must replace technology that has become increasingly unreliable while keeping the existing network available to aircraft already in the sky.
The government cannot shut down American aviation for months while engineers rebuild everything from scratch.
So technicians replace equipment in stages. They test connections and move services from old systems to new ones.
Every change must fit into a larger network that continues operating.
The November 13 incident shows how difficult that can become.
A problem associated with remote communications facilities affected much of the national air traffic system. Controllers followed safety procedures, and aircraft landed safely.
The investigation must now establish what failed, why the problem spread, and whether existing safeguards worked as intended.
The FAA should also explain what it learned from the incident and how those lessons will change future installations.
More money may help replace old equipment faster.
It cannot substitute for reliable engineering decisions.
Before Congress funds the next stage of modernization, the FAA should be able to show not only what it plans to install, but how it will prove that each change is safe while the rest of the system keeps running.
Primary Sources and Further Reporting
- FAA: Nationwide Ground Stop Questions and Answers, November 15, 2026
- GAO: Air Traffic Control Systems, September 14, 2026
- GAO: FAA Actions Are Urgently Needed to Modernize Aging Systems, September 2024
- U.S. DOT: $50.1 Billion Funding Request, November 17, 2026
- The Washington Post: FAA Oversaw and Signed Off on Repair Work, November 17, 2026
