Editorial illustration comparing a European employment office with voters waiting outside an Indian polling station.

Why Europe Racialises Muslims While India Counts Their Votes

In Europe, a Muslim name can become a marker of ancestry. In India, religious identity can become an electoral calculation. Neither tells us enough about the person.

Imagine a job applicant in Germany whose name suggests a Muslim family background.

The employer has not asked about religion. The applicant may be practising, indifferent to faith or no longer Muslim. Yet the name might influence how the employer judges the application.

Now consider an Indian election.

A television analyst discusses the Muslim vote as though millions of people have made one political decision.

I find something troubling in both situations.

The European employer may assign a religious identity to someone who has said nothing about personal belief. The Indian commentator may assume that a shared religion produces a shared political preference.

Neither assumption is necessarily correct.

Europe and India have different histories. Their political institutions also operate differently.

But both examples raise a question I keep returning to.

How much can we learn about a person from the religious category others place them in?

When Muslim Identity Becomes Something Others Can See

Islam is a religion, not a race.

Muslims have different ethnic backgrounds and speak many languages. Their religious practices vary, as do their political beliefs.

Still, people sometimes treat Muslim identity as though it can be recognised from a name or physical appearance.

Researchers describe this process as racialisation.

A person may be identified as Muslim because of family ancestry, even when that identification is incorrect.

I examined a revealing example in my earlier article, When Did Being Muslim Become an Identity Others Assign?

Researchers at the University of St Andrews studied Christians of Middle Eastern heritage living in Britain who were sometimes mistaken for Muslims.

The study did not measure how frequently this happens across Britain. It examined the experiences of particular participants.

Its importance lies elsewhere.

People who identified as Christian could still encounter assumptions associated with Islam because strangers connected Middle Eastern ancestry with Muslim identity.

The religion someone actually practised was not always the religion others assigned.

That is what racialisation can do.

It turns a complex identity into something that appears fixed and visible.

The European Evidence Is More Specific Than the Stereotype

In October 2024, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights published Being Muslim in the EU.

The report drew on interviews and online responses from 9,604 people who identified as Muslim across 13 European Union countries.

Fieldwork took place between October 2021 and October 2022.

Among those surveyed, 47% reported racial discrimination during the previous five years.

The agency used a definition covering discrimination associated with religion, skin colour and ethnic or immigrant background.

The findings matter because they concern experiences with real consequences.

Someone may struggle to find work because an employer associates a Muslim identity with assumptions about suitability.

A woman wearing religious clothing may encounter discrimination that another applicant does not.

The survey found that 39% of relevant respondents reported racial discrimination when looking for work over the five-year period.

There are limits to these figures.

The survey covered selected populations in 13 countries. Its findings should not be presented as a measurement of every Muslim living in Europe.

The agency also used different sampling methods across countries, which affects how broadly some results can be generalised.

Even with those qualifications, the evidence points to a serious problem.

A religious label can influence how institutions and individuals treat people.

The applicant may never have been asked what they believe.

India’s Muslim Vote Is Not One Vote

India presents a different question.

Political commentators often discuss Muslims as a vote bank.

The expression suggests a community whose members can be counted together because they are expected to support particular parties.

Religious identity certainly matters in Indian elections.

Parties appeal to religious communities. Voters also respond to political arguments involving minority rights and religious majoritarianism.

But the idea of a single Muslim vote becomes less convincing when we examine the evidence.

A study published in 2024, Indian Muslims: (Self-)Perceptions and Voting Trends in 2024, used the CSDS-Lokniti National Election Study post-poll survey.

Its Muslim sample included 2,953 respondents.

The survey estimated that 38% of Muslim respondents voted for Congress in the 2024 general election.

Another 26% supported Congress’s INDIA alliance partners.

The BJP received 7%, while NDA allies received 2%. Other parties accounted for 27%.

These figures are survey estimates, not official counts of votes by religion.

They nevertheless show that Muslim voters did not all support the same party.

The opposition INDIA alliance attracted a substantial share of Muslim votes. That is politically significant.

But strong support for an alliance does not mean every Muslim voter has the same priorities.

Nor does it prove that the same voting pattern will continue in every election.

Why the State Matters More Than the Label

Consider the difference between Kerala and Uttar Pradesh.

Both have substantial Muslim populations. Their political systems, however, are different.

Kerala’s competition involves alliances led by the Congress and the Left, while Uttar Pradesh has a different pattern of party competition.

A Muslim voter choosing among candidates in Kerala is not facing the same political options as a Muslim voter in Uttar Pradesh.

That difference changes the meaning of the Muslim vote.

Political scientist Feyaad Allie explored these variations in Mapping Muslim Voting Behavior in India.

His research shows that Muslim voting patterns differ across states and that internal social divisions can affect electoral behaviour.

He also found evidence of concentrated Muslim support for leading opposition parties in some state elections.

In West Bengal’s 2021 election, for example, survey evidence indicated that about 75% of Muslim voters supported the Trinamool Congress.

In Uttar Pradesh’s 2022 election, around 79% supported the Samajwadi Party.

Those are substantial majorities.

It would be wrong to dismiss religious solidarity as politically irrelevant.

But the preferred party differed between states.

Muslim voters were not following one national political instruction.

They were making choices within particular electoral contests.

I think that distinction is often lost when commentators speak about a vote bank.

A shared concern may produce concentrated voting without erasing differences within the community.

The Caste Question That Changes the Argument

There is another reason to be cautious about treating Indian Muslims as one political group.

Caste.

Islamic religious teachings emphasise equality among believers. But South Asian Muslim societies developed social hierarchies associated with ancestry and inherited occupation.

Researchers have documented caste-based distinctions among Indian Muslims.

The terms Ashraf, Ajlaf and Arzal appear in discussions of those hierarchies, although their meanings and use differ across regions.

Not every Muslim identifies with these categories.

Yet social exclusion does not disappear merely because a religious tradition rejects hereditary status in principle.

The Pasmanda movement has brought greater attention to disadvantaged Muslim communities.

Pasmanda is commonly used to describe those left behind.

Its political importance lies in a difficult question.

Should Muslim organisations focus primarily on religious discrimination against the community as a whole?

Or should they also confront inequalities among Muslims?

The two concerns are not mutually exclusive.

A person may face prejudice because of religion while also experiencing caste-based exclusion within the Muslim community.

The phrase Muslim vote bank tells us almost nothing about how that person weighs these problems.

Indian Law Does Not Treat Every Muslim Community Alike

The distinction becomes more concrete when we examine Indian law.

Paragraph 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, as amended, restricts Scheduled Caste recognition to people professing Hinduism, Sikhism or Buddhism.

A person who professes Islam cannot receive Scheduled Caste recognition under that Order, even if their community has a history of caste-based disadvantage.

The restriction remains controversial.

But Scheduled Caste status is not the only form of affirmative action in India.

Some Muslim communities are included in the Other Backward Classes category.

The Ministry of Minority Affairs has published government information identifying Muslim communities on the central OBC list.

Scheduled Tribe recognition operates under a separate legal framework and does not carry the same religion-based restriction.

These distinctions have practical consequences.

They affect eligibility for particular reservations and legal protections.

A Muslim citizen may therefore seek recognition because of a specific community’s social disadvantage rather than because all Muslims supposedly occupy the same social position.

The legal category matters.

It also reveals how little the phrase Muslim community can tell us without further information.

What Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind Actually Asked For

The original debate that prompted this article included claims about Muslim political organisations using the language of oppression.

I wanted to examine those claims rather than repeat them.

One distinction proved important.

Jamaat-e-Islami Hind and Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind are different organisations.

In 2022, Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind sought to participate in Supreme Court proceedings concerning Scheduled Caste recognition for Dalit Muslims.

The organisation’s own legal-case record identifies its intervention application in proceedings concerning Scheduled Caste status.

The application concerned a particular legal disadvantage.

It did not establish that all Muslims belong to one oppressed caste.

Nor could I verify the separate allegation that Jamaat-e-Islami Hind had officially declared all Muslims an oppressed caste.

That claim should not be treated as fact without an attributable statement.

I would apply the same standard to any political organisation.

Its actual documents and proposals matter more than assumptions about its motives.

Europe and India Are Not Opposite Worlds

I do not want to turn this comparison into another stereotype.

Europe also has debates about Muslim voters. India has discrimination linked to religious identity.

Neither society can be reduced to one political habit.

The difference I am examining concerns two questions that often dominate public discussion.

In European discrimination research, the question may be whether someone receives unequal treatment because others identify them as Muslim.

In Indian electoral research, the question may be whether Muslim identity helps explain a person’s vote.

One examines treatment by others.

The other examines political behaviour.

Both require evidence.

A Muslim name cannot tell an employer whether an applicant will perform a job well.

A Muslim identity cannot tell an election analyst which party an individual supported.

There may be patterns worth investigating at the population level.

But patterns are not personal biographies.

They do not erase differences between people who share a religious label.

What the Labels Prevent Us From Seeing

I have written before about the problem of assigning political responsibility through religious identity.

In Not in My Name: Why Must Jews Answer for Israel and Muslims Answer for Terrorism?, I examined how people can be expected to answer for actions they did not take.

The European and Indian cases involve a related problem.

People are judged through a group identity before their individual circumstances have been examined.

Sometimes the result is discrimination.

Sometimes it is a misleading political conclusion.

The consequences differ, but both can begin with an assumption about what being Muslim must mean.

Religious identity remains important.

It can influence how people understand their place in society. It may also shape their political choices.

I would not pretend otherwise.

But I would ask a European employer to judge an applicant’s qualifications rather than infer them from a name.

I would ask an Indian political analyst to examine how voters actually behave rather than treat their religion as a completed explanation.

The EU survey and Indian election data do not tell the same story.

One documents experiences of discrimination. The other measures political choices.

Both become more useful when we respect what the evidence can establish.

The problem is not that societies recognise Muslim identity. It begins when they think the label has already told them everything worth knowing.

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